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C R I M I N A L L A W
"Killer Choices": Felony Murder,
Lesser Offenses, and
the Death Penalty
by Daniel D. Blinka
PREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases, pages 284-287. © 1998 American Bar Association.
Daniel D. Blinka is associate
professor of law at Marquette
University Law School;
Milwaukee, WI;
(414) 288-5358.
ISSUE
This case concerns the interplay
between felony murder, the lesser-
included-offense doctrine, and
constitutional restrictions on capital
punishment. Specifically, does
Nebraska's rule that felony murder
does not contain any lesser included
offenses mean that a death sentence
imposed for felony murder is
unconstitutional?
FACTS
Randolph Reeves murdered two
women at a Quaker meetinghouse
in Lincoln, Nebraska, in March
1980. High on alcohol and peyote,
Reeves entered through a window
and proceeded to an upstairs bed-
room where he sexually assaulted
one woman and stabbed her seven
times with a knife. Another woman
was present in the house, and
Reeves stabbed her to death as well.
The first victim managed to call for
help and identify Reeves as her
attacker before she died hours
later in a hospital.
Nebraska charged Reeves with
two counts of felony murder.
Specifically, the State alleged that
Reeves committed murder in the
course of, or while attempting to
commit, first-degree sexual assault.
The trial jury rejected Reeves'
defenses of insanity and diminished
capacity, convicting him of both
felony murder charges. Under
Nebraska law, a first-degree felony
murder conviction is punishable by
death or life imprisonment. A three-
judge panel sentenced Reeves to
death.
Reeves appealed to the Nebraska
Supreme Court and that court
affirmed the death sentence despite
several errors by the sentencing
panel. 334 N.W.2d 433 (1984).
Reeves pursued his state-law,
post-conviction remedies but was
rebuffed again by the Nebraska
Supreme Court. 453 N.W.2d 359
(1990). Although the United States
Supreme Court vacated the
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Nebraska high court's second deci-
sion and sent the case back to that
court for reconsideration in light of
the Court's decision in Clemons v.
Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738 (1990)
(defining and limiting the authority
of state appellate courts to uphold
death sentences despite errors at
trial), the Nebraska Supreme Court
again affirmed Reeves' death sen-
tence. 476 N.W.2d 829 (1991).
Reeves exhausted his remedies
under Nebraska law and then
turned to federal court by filing a
petition for habeas corpus relief
(see Glossary), raising 44 claims.
The district court initially reversed
the death sentence, 871 F. Supp.
1182 (D. Neb. 1994), but the
Eighth Circuit reversed in turn and
sent the case back to the district
court for further proceedings,
76 F.3d 1424 (8th Cir. 1996).
On its second look, the district
court again reversed the death
sentence, this time concluding that
the Nebraska Supreme Court failed
to provide Reeves adequate notice
and a hearing when it "resentenced"
him. 928 F. Supp. 941 (D. Neb. 1996).
The State appealed, and once more
the Eighth Circuit reversed on the
sentencing issue but concluded nev-
ertheless that Reeves deserved a
new trial because the trial judge had
improperly denied his request for
lesser-included-offense instructions
in violation of Beck v. Alabama, 447
U.S. 625 (1980). (Beck held that it
is unconstitutional to impose the
death penalty when a state statute
forbids a jury to find the defendant
guilty of a noncapital, lesser includ-
ed offense.)
Reeves, the appeals court noted,
requested but was denied jury
instructions on second-degree mur-
der and manslaughter, lesser includ-
ed offenses with respect to the
offense of capital, felony murder.
According to the Eighth Circuit,
Beck "held that in a capital case due
process requires that the jury be
given the option of convicting the
defendant on a lesser included, non-
capital offense if the evidence would
support conviction on that offense."
102 F.3d 977, 982 (8th Cir. 1996).
Thus, said the appeals court, Beck
seeks to avoid presenting juries with
a choice of "death or nothing."
The Eighth Circuit then explained
that under Nebraska criminal law
there are no lesser included offenses
of felony murder, a charge that
''conclusively presumes" the intent
to kill from the underlying felony. In
Reeves' case, the jury could conclu-
sively presume his intent to kill
from the fact that the victims died
during the course of a sexual
assault. Yet, said the appeals court,
this reasoning would seem to violate
other United States Supreme Court
decisions requiring proof of intent
to kill if the death penalty is to be
imposed.
The Eighth Circuit ruled in short
that Nebraska could not have it
both ways. Either its bar against
jury consideration of lesser crimes
violated Beck or its felony murder
statute contravened case law requir-
ing proof of mental culpability.
The case is back before the
Supreme Court, which granted
the State's petition for a writ of
certiorari. 118 S. Ct. 30 (1997).
CASE ANALYSIS
In general, a defendant is tried on
the charges selected by the prosecu-
tor. The jury's options are to find
the defendant guilty or not guilty
of the charged offenses.
The lesser-included-offense doctrine
broadens the jury's options in some
instances. Most jurisdictions permit
both the prosecution and the
defense to request lesser-included-
offense instructions, but the judge
must answer two questions in
determining the propriety of such
instructions. The first question is
whether the substantive criminal
law recognizes the crime on which
an instruction is requested as a
lesser offense of the crime charged?
If it does, the second question is
whether the evidence at trial
supports the conclusion that the
defendant is not guilty of the
charged offense but is guilty of a
lesser included offense.
This case presents a conflict among
federal appeals courts focusing
largely on the first question. The
Eighth Circuit's opinion is flatly
inconsistent with the Ninth Circuit's
decision in Greenwalt v. Ricketts,
943 F.2d 1020 (9th Cir. 1991),
which held Beck inapplicable
because Arizona law - like
Nebraska law - recognizes no
lesser included offenses of felony
murder.
Nebraska, of course, agrees with the
Ninth Circuit. In the State's view,
the Constitution does not mandate
lesser-included-offense instructions
when state law recognizes no such
lesser offenses. Nebraska argues that
its law has been clear for more than
a century: felony murder has no
lesser offenses. Accordingly, the
Eighth Circuit's decision will have a
significant and disruptive impact on
Nebraska's criminal law.
Nebraska also maintains that Beck
is different from this case. As the
State sees it, the pivotal fact in Beck
was that Alabama law recognized a
lesser included offense of the crime
charged, but a statute specifically
prohibited its use solely in capital
cases. That, argues the State, is not
the case here. Nebraska law does
not recognize the lesser-included-
offense doctrine in any felony mur-
der case whether the penalty is
death or life imprisonment.
(Continued on Page 286)
American Bar Association 285
The State also notes that unlike
the situation in Beck, the jury in
Reeves' trial played no role in sen-
tencing him; rather, he was sen-
tenced by a panel of judges who had
the option of a life sentence without
parole. In short, argues Nebraska,
Reeves' trial jury was not placed in
a Beck-like, death-or-acquit situa-
tion. Further, the jury's determina-
tion of guilt was not dispositive of
the sentence; the panel of judges
was free to follow whatever course
it thought appropriate.
Nebraska next contends that Reeves
cannot meet the second require-
ment for a lesser-included-offense
instruction - namely, that the
evidence at trial supported his
requested instructions on second-
degree murder and manslaughter.
Reeves' sole defense at trial, accord-
ing to the State, was that he lacked
the mental capacity to understand
what he was doing when he killed
the two women. His defense, if
believed by the jury, would have
exonerated him of any criminal
responsibility; but, says the State, it
would not have resulted in his con-
viction on a lesser included offense.
Reeves responds that the Eighth
Circuit correctly applied Beck.
Pointing to evidence in the record
Reeves contends that the jury could
have convicted him of second-
degree murder or manslaughter
had it been given those options.
For example, Reeves maintains that
his intoxication raised questions
about his capacity to form the spe-
cific intent to kill, and the physical
evidence created ambiguity about
whether a first-degree sexual assault
actually occurred.
Reeves also defends the Eighth
Circuit's decision and argues that
the appeals court did not "rewrite"
Nebraska's criminal law. On this
point, Reeves notes that Nebraska
recognizes lesser included offenses
for all species of homicide except
felony murder, an aberration never
explained by its supreme court.
Reeves also attacks the reasoning
behind the Nebraska rule. The rule
is based on the premise that the
purpose or intent to kill is conclu-
sively presumed from the criminal
intent required for sexual assault.
But, counters Reeves, that begs the
question - namely, did he harbor
the requisite intent to kill? In short,
Nebraska never fully or clearly
explained the reasons for its unique
felony murder rule. Yet, Reeves
maintains that under the State's
general homicide and lesser
offense law, he was entitled to
the instructions.
Reeves next argues that the Beck
rule applies with full force even
when a panel of judges, not a jury,
decides the sentence in a capital
case. Reeves contends that
Nebraska's sentencing scheme
actually presents a greater danger
of unreliable capital convictions
precisely because the jury is told
not to consider the consequences
of its verdict.
In the event Reeves should prevail,
Nebraska advances a fallback argu-
ment: the Eighth Circuit's holding is
a new rule within the meaning of
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288
(1989) (plurality opinion [see
Glossary], and thus is unavailable to
help Reeves in this case. (Teague
precludes application of new consti-
tutionally derived rules of criminal
procedure to cases that are final
when the new rule is announced.
Final in the Teague context means
that the defendant has exhausted or
waived all direct appeals, i.e.,
appeals as a matter of right, and the
United States Supreme Court either
considered or refused to consider
any final direct-appeal decision.)
SIGNIFICANCE
Each state has its own relatively
unique body of criminal law.
Federalism, the division of authority
between the states and the national
government, traditionally has given
the states wide latitude to define
crimes in their own ways.
There are, however, constitutionally
imposed minimum requirements
that states must observe. The
Supreme Court thus has the
opportunity in this case to expand
or contract the sphere within which
states can operate in defining what
constitutes a crime and how
criminals are punished.
Of all varieties of capital murder,
felony murder is perhaps the most
controversial. A number of states
have repealed their felony murder
laws because the rationale of such
crimes runs counter to more
modern thinking about criminal
culpability.
Murder is defined generically as the
purposeful taking of human life
without justification or excuse.
Murder is reprehensible because the
defendant formed the mental pur-
pose to take human life and acted
on that state of mind. Yet, one of
the more difficult tasks in a murder
case is proving that the defendant in
fact had the purpose to kill when he
or she committed the lethal act.
Felony murder, unlike murder, is
committed when the defendant kills
someone during the course of per-
petrating some other crime defined
as a felony. For example, in this
case Reeves' victims died while he
was committing the felony of sexual
assault. Although the prosecutor
must prove all elements of sexual
assault, including the intent to have
nonconsensual sexual contact,
felony murder does not require
Issue No. 5
proof that the defendant intended to
kill. Culpability in connection with
the underlying felony, e.g., sexual
assault, is sufficient for a felony
murder conviction and, perhaps, a
death sentence.
The practical consequences of all
this is clear. It is easier for a prose-
cutor to obtain the death penalty by
charging felony murder than by
charging intentional murder.
Critics, however, contend that
felony murder unduly dilutes the
mental culpability required for
murder, especially in capital cases.
The problem is aggravated in juris-
dictions, like Nebraska, that recog-
nize no lesser included offenses for
felony murder.
The lesser-included-offense doctrine
widens the range of a capital jury's
options. The competing views are
straightforward. The prosecutor
wants to restrict a jury's options to
guilty or not guilty of felony murder.
To the extent that the defendant
can widen the array of options by
allowing the jury to consider non-
capital crimes as well as the capital
crime of felony murder, the likeli-
hood of a death sentence diminishes
significantly. Although cloaked in
abstruse jargon about felony murder
and lesser offenses, at bottom this
case addresses the range of options
that juries should be given in capital
cases.
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